Rev. Pinkney files this reply brief in relation to three matters stated in the prosecution’s brief on Appeal. These include whether evidence Pinkney presented during his defense may be considered when Pinkney made a motion for a direct verdict at the end of the prosecution’s case in chief, and when there was no basis for this evidence to allow for an affirmative finding of guilt, even if the jury disbelieved Pinkney’s evidence.
The standard of review in relation to some of the “Other Acts” evidence, when the prosecution did not provide the required notice under MRE 404 (b)(2) and when defense counsel made an objection after some of the evidence had been admitted and made similar objections throughout the trial and prior to trial in relation to the evidence that was subject to proper notice under MRE 404 (b)(2). The prosecutor’s remarkable statement in its brief that Pinkney’s First Amendment activities were “not evidence of other crimes and could not be prejudicial in nature, because they involved things like the fight for freedom and justice and equality for all and to provide food, clothes, and shelter for the needy.” When the prosecution argued to the jury that this was not true and argued that jury should come to conclusion about Pinkney’s activities that clearly indicate the prosecution had an improper and prejudicial purpose in admitting the “Other acts” evidence.
The prosecution indicates that the defense presentation of testimony regarding Veniter? Campbell supports the prosecution’s claim that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Pinkney is guilty, that is the most ridiculous statement. This testimony obviously came after the prosecution rested. In Pinkney brief he made a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief. The issue was whether the prosecution met burden of proof must be evaluated on in reference to evidence admitted at this point.
The main problem is that the evidence doesn’t lie, but prosecutors do.